Ad hominem arguments don't have to be fallacious.
Justin Martyr and Cornelius Van Til make ready use of them.
Ah, the infamous ad hominem fallacy. Whether or not you know what this phrase means, you’ve undoubtedly witnessed it on the political stage when candidates attack each other’s characters instead of the policies being discussed. Ad hominem is Latin for “to the person” and refers to arguments made against the opponent’s character, beliefs, or attributes. They target the opponent himself, not the substance of the argument.
Most of us were taught that ad hominem attacks are a type of logical fallacy. Sure, most of them are faulty, but ad hominem can be valid if used judiciously. Justin Martyr, the most well-known apologist of the 2nd century A.D., made effective ad hominem arguments in his First Apology by appealing to the Roman rulers’ respect for truth to conjure their distaste for the hypocrisies and lies fed to them about Christianity. However, we live in a world that is far different from Ancient Rome; a world which considers it imperious to declare or appeal to an absolute truth. Can modern apologists make ad hominem arguments and appeal to the good character of their opponents if there is no constancy of character to be found?
Before we delve into the use of ad hominem in both ancient and modern apologetics, let’s indirectly flesh out the bounds of rational argumentation by looking at three common logical fallacies:
The straw man argument: make a caricature of your opponent’s position so it’s easier to knock down.
Red herring: bringing up something with minimal relevance to the topic at hand with the goal of distraction and diversion.
Tu quoque (Latin for “you also”): stating that your opponent’s personal character or behaviors contradict their current argument, therefore the argument holds no weight. This is a fallacious subtype of ad hominem.
I have heard each made in reference to Christianity: the straw man fallacy might say, as Richard Dawkins does, that he can’t believe in a religion which features “talking snakes.” This statement incorrectly reduces the complexity of the divine being in Genesis 3 to the simplicity of a garden variety reptile. The red herring fallacy might respond to a debate over the historical support for Jesus’s existence with a progressivist comment that eyewitnesses were gullible and unreliable back in those days. Finally, tu quoque might manifest as a corrupt pastor arguing that Christianity forbids the sexual abuse of women, to which their opponent could reply “oh, but you’ve abused women yourself”— an appropriately condemnatory statement but not relevant to the validity of the independent moral statement that sexual abuse is wrong.
But there are also ad hominem arguments which are not fallacious:
Questioning someone’s credentials when relevant.
If the consistent application of a conclusion or argument necessitates that the arguer give up his own position.
The first is easy to understand. If your friend possesses no medical training yet advises you against the treatment your doctor has prescribed, it would be appropriate to point to your friend’s lack of credentialing to undermine their treatment choice. The second type of ad hominem argument is subjective; how do you determine what is relevant to the point at hand? We can modify the example of the corrupt pastor above: if this pastor simultaneously engaged in regular abuse of women and asserted that he followed Christian moral tenets, we could attack that assertion on the basis of his repetitive sinful actions, for they prove the pastor’s declaration of moral fidelity to be false.
Cornelius Van Til uses a transcendental approach to ad hominem, which “entails arguing ad hominem from the impossibility of the contrary and reasoning analogically to show the self-contradiction of any non-theistic position based on its own assumptions.”1 Let’s break this sentence down for the layman:
“Transcendental approach”: this approach looks at the presuppositions behind a position; what are the assumptions which make it plausible?
“Analogical”: based on an analogy; stressing a point of similarity between two different things (e.g. saying that someone is “cool as a cucumber”).
Here’s where it gets tricky: Van Til expanded on the term “analogical” to refer to a type of reasoning that the human is capable of in reference to God. His definition was the subject of a good bit of debate. He believed that humans can only possess an analogy of the truth, the whole of which is in God: “Van Til wants to maintain at every point the Creator/creature distinction.”2
The Reformed theologian K. Scott Oliphint gives an example of Van Til’s analogical reasoning: let’s say we see a red rose. As humans, we know that this flower is a rose and that it is red, but God’s knowledge of that very same rose and of its redness is “eternal, absolute, exhaustive, and original”; thus our knowledge of this red rose is finite and dependent on God’s revelation. In other words, “man’s true knowledge is analogical to God’s true knowledge.”3
“Impossibility of the contrary”: two contradictory statements cannot both be true.
“Self-contradiction”: Van Til wants the apologist to show that the assumptions (presuppositions) behind the non-Christian’s point of view are both self-contradictory and contradict the assumptions of Christian theism.
…but how is Van Til’s approach truly ad hominem? Because it tries to expose the inconstancy and irrationality of the nonbeliever himself, even while it uses his assumptions to do so. Thus we have the third type of non-fallacious ad hominem arguments.
We will begin our dive into Justin Martyr’s First Apology with his discussion of justice, which will contain—you guessed it!— ad hominem arguments. The First Apology was written in response to the martyrdom of Polycarp, a bishop in Smyrna who was burned at the stake for a refusal to forsake Christ to Roman authorities (see this letter written c. 200 A.D. by Evarastus describing Polycarp’s arrest and Roman attempts at execution). Justin Martyr himself was a philosopher who studied (and rejected) Stoicism, Aristotelianism, Pythagoreanism, and Platonism before Christianity. He describes his own conversion beautifully; note his intellectual conversion coupled with an emotional response to his newfound faith:
When he [an elderly man who told Justin that Christianity was true] had spoken these and many other things, which there is no time for mentioning at present, he went away, bidding me attend to them; and I have not seen him since. But straightway a flame was kindled in my soul; and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind, I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable. Thus, and for this reason, I am a philosopher. Moreover, I would wish that all, making a resolution similar to my own, do not keep themselves away from the words of the Saviour. For they possess a terrible power in themselves, and are sufficient to inspire those who turn aside from the path of rectitude with awe; while the sweetest rest is afforded those who make a diligent practice of them.
Of course, many philosophers in Justin’s time did not recognize Christianity as truth; they instead leveled several common charges against Christianity:4
Atheism: Christians rejected Greek gods and idols; it seemed as if they had no gods at all.
Cannibalism: Christians took the Lord’s supper, where Jesus said of the bread: “This is my body, which will be given for you.” And of the wine: “This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood.”
Incest: Christians greeted one another with a holy kiss to symbolize fellowship and brotherly love.
Insubordination to the government
Abandonment of tradition
Justin Martyr knew that no man is truly independent; we all obey something, whether that is a person, religion, or set of values or beliefs, and he calls on the Roman authorities to act upon their stated obedience to piety and philosophy.
In response to these objections, Justin writes on behalf of “those of all nations who are unjustly hated and wantonly abused, myself being one of them.” The first three chapters of Justin’s First Apology demand justice for Christians by appealing ad hominem to who the Roman authorities claim to be— philosophers and proponents of justice:
Reason directs those who are truly pious and philosophical to honour and love only what is true, declining to follow traditional opinions, if these be worthless. For not only does sound reason direct us to refuse the guidance of those who did or taught anything wrong, but it is incumbent on the lover of truth, by all means, if death be threatened, even before his own life, to choose to do and say what is right. Do you, then, since ye are called pious and philosophers, guardians of justice and lovers of learning, give good heed, and hearken to my address; and if ye are indeed such, it will be manifested. For we have come, not to flatter you by this writing, nor to please you by our address, but to beg that you pass judgment, after an accurate and searching investigation, not flattered by prejudice or by a desire of pleasing superstitious men, nor induced by irrational impulse or evil rumours which have long been prevalent, to give a decision which will prove to be against yourselves.
This is followed by a call for fairness in chapter 3. If Christians are indeed doing evil things (which they were not) and are found deserving of punishment, then in the name of fairness, the deserving shall be punished. To this point, Justin appeals again to the reason and judgment of Roman leaders over their passion for violence:
We demand that the charges against the Christians be investigated, and that, if these be substantiated, they be punished as they deserve; [or rather, indeed, we ourselves will punish them].
[…] The rulers should give their decision to obedience, not to violence and tyranny, but to piety and philosophy.
Justin knew that no man is truly independent; we all obey something, whether that is a person, religion, or set of values or beliefs, and he calls on the Roman authorities to act in accordance with their stated allegiance to piety and philosophy. Justin then steps beyond ad hominem and appeals to the rulers’ underlying desire for a flourishing State:
For thus would both rulers and ruled reap benefit. For even one of the ancients somewhere said, ‘Unless both rulers and ruled philosophize, it is impossible to make states blessed.’
He closes his discussion of justice by reiterating his belief in God as the final arbiter, even where the Roman authorities are concerned:
For if, when ye have learned the truth, you do not what is just, you will be before God without excuse.
Next week, we will delve into chapter 4 of the First Apology to learn how Justin advocates for those unjustly condemned by their name alone. In the meantime, consider how you may adapt the ad hominem tactic to defend Christian theism against its numerous modern critics. I would advise against appealing to a respect for truth, as the philosophers did, for absolute truth or truth apart from scientific observation is often thought not to exist. Instead, I would search for mutual values or tenets— fairness, justice, the dignity and value of human life— and show how Christianity fulfills them to the highest. Just be cautious to define your terms beforehand. For example, if referencing a secular person’s valuation of human life, one must ensure that the definition of human includes humans of all developmental stages; although, if the secular person does not hold to the scientific definition of a human, there presents an opportunity to point out a fallacy.
The Reformed theologian Cornelius Van Til, Found in the english Wikipedia, Copyrighted free use, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=478472
Oliphint, Scott K., “The Consistency of Van Til’s Methodology”, Westminster Theological Journal 52 (1990): 40-42, http://files1.wts.edu/uploads/images/files/publications/Oliphint/Consistency%20of%20VT's%20method%20WTJ.pdf.
Ibid, 38.
Ibid, 39.
Edgar, William and Oliphint, Scott K., “Justin Martyr", in Christian Apologetics Past and Present (Volume 1, to 1500): A Primary Source Reader (Crossway, September 13, 2011), 70-86.
This was really interesting. I think I still feel some confusion about why Van Til's arguments are ad hominems...it would seem to me, along the lines of logic you're proposing, all claims of logical fallacy would be claims of some sort of inconsistency. And so, all logical fallacy claims would then be ad hominem. What am I missing?